Constitutional Law - Due Process and Equal Protection - Mandatory Leave Rules for Public School Teachers by Clapp, Richard A.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 50 Number 4 Article 7 
1973 
Constitutional Law - Due Process and Equal Protection - 
Mandatory Leave Rules for Public School Teachers 
Richard A. Clapp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clapp, Richard A. (1973) "Constitutional Law - Due Process and Equal Protection - Mandatory Leave Rules 
for Public School Teachers," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 4 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol50/iss4/7 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION-MAN-
DATORY LEAVE RULES FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS.
Respondents Jo Carol La Fleur and Ann Elizabeth Nelson and
petitioner Susan Cohen are public school teachers.1 Each became
pregnant during the 1970-1971 school year. Each informed her res-
pective school board of her pregnancy and requested that she be
permitted to continue teaching until shortly before the expected
date of delivery.2 These requests were denied by the school boards.
Pursuant to mandatory maternity leave rules8 La Fleur, Nelson
and Cohen were compelled to quit their jobs, without pay, several
months prior to their expected delivery dates.4 Separate suits were
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 challenging the constitutionality of
the maternity leave rules. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in both cases6 and held that the mandatory maternity
1. Respondents are junior high school teachers employed by the Board of Education of
Cleveland, Ohio. Petitioner was employed by the School Board of Chesterfield County, Vir-
ginia.
2. LaFleur and Nelson, expecting their children to be born during the summer of 1971,
requested that they be permitted to continue teaching until the end of the school year. Mrs.
Cohen, whose expected date of delivery was April 28, 1971, initially sought permission to
teach until April 1, 1971, but subsequently revised her request backwards to January 21,
1971.
3. Respondents were forced to leave their jobs in March of 1971, at least four months
prior to actual delivery. Mrs. Cohen was required to leave her job on December 18, 1970,
approximately five months prior to the birth of her child.
4. The Cleveland rule requires every pregnant teacher to take a leave without pay, five
months before the expected date of delivery. No teacher on maternity leave may return to
work until the beginning of the school semester following the date when her child reaches
three months of age. The teacher on leave is not guaranteed reemployment.
The Chesterfield County rule requires a pregnant teacher to leave work at least four
months prior to the expected date of birth. A teacher may be reemployed when she submits
a physician's statement declaring her physically fit for carrying on classroom duties. For
the full text of the rules see Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791,
794-95 (1974).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or useage, of any State of Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper pifoceeding for redress.
6. La Fleur and Nelson filed separate suits in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio. The District Court tried the cases together and rejected the
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leave rules denied the teachers due process of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974).
The Court noted that it has long been recognized that freedom
of choice in matters relating to marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment7 Because mandatory maternity leave rules may
affect this liberty by penalizing8 a teacher for deciding to bear a
child, the Due Process Clause requires that the interests advanced
by the rules must be rational and necessary.9 Further, the rules must
not needlessly, arbitrarily or capriciously impinge upon the pro-
tected liberty.10
The school boards argued that the firm cut-off dates were neces-
sary to maintain continuity of classroom instruction. Their rationale
was that advance knowledge of when a pregnant teacher must leave
facilitates finding and hiring a replacement. The Court agreed that
continuity of instruction is a legitimate educational goal and that
requiring teachers to provide early notice of their condition facili-
tates administrative planning." However, while advance notice is
rational and necessary, an absolute requirement that a teacher leave
work at the end of the fourth or fifth month bears no rational
relationship to the valid interest of preserving continuity of instruc-
tion.12 Cut-off dates much later during the pregnancy would serve
teacher's arguments. La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), rev'd 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) affjd 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed finding the Cleveland rules in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. La Fleur v. Cleveland
Board of Education, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir, 1972), aff'd 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). Mrs. Cohen
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Dis-
trict Court held that the Chesterfield County rules violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159
(E.D. Va. 1971). A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed but, on rehearing en banc,
upheld the constitutionality of the challenged regulations. Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974).
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court In both cases in order to resolve the
conflict between the Court of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of mandatory mater-
nity leave rules for public school teachers. Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 411
U.S. 947 (1973).
Apart from the La Fleur and Cohen cases at least three other federal appellate
opinions dealing with the constitutionality of mandatory maternity leave regulations are
reported. Compare Green v. Waterford Board of Educaaion, 473 F.2d 629 (2nd Cir. 1973) ;
Buckly v. Coyle Public School System, 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1978) with Schattman v.
Texas Employment Commission, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107
(1973).
7. 94 S. Ct. at 796.
8. Justice Powell objects to deciding the case on the ground that maternity leave regu-
lations impair any right to bear children. 94 S. Ct. at 802 (Powell, J., concurring). In
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, (1970), the Supreme Court upheld limitations on the
welfare benefits a family may receive that do not take into account the size of the family.
Justice Powell notes that if some intentional efforts to penalize childbearing are constitu-
tional, then the maternity rules are not invalid because they infringe on any right to bear
children. 94 S. Ct. at 802.
9. 94 S. Ct. at 796-98.
10. Id. at 796. Justice Stewart's language is quite similar to that used by Justice White
in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965).
11. 94 S. Ct. at 797.
12. Id.
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as well or better.'" The Court argued that since the arbitrary cut-off
dates will fall at different times in the school year for different
teachers the rules may actually serve to hinder attainment of con-
tinuity.
14
The school boards also argued that the rules are justified be-
cause they serve to protect the health of the teacher and her unborn
child while at the same time assuring that the students have a
physically capable instructor.15 The Court responded that the rules
"sweep too broadly."'18 The regulations amount to a conclusive pre-
sumption that every pregnant teacher who reaches the fixed cut-off
date is incapable of carrying on in her job.1 7 The Due Process
Clause requires a more individualized determination. 8
Prior to La Fleur, the Supreme Court had held that the rules
which embody conclusive presumptions are disfavored under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 9
In Bell v. Burson20 the Court held invalid a Georgia statute requir-
ing any uninsured motorist involved in an accident to post a bond
for the protection of possible claimants or suffer suspension of his
license. The petitioner refused to post such a bond and his license
was suspended. The Court rules the statutory procedure to be vio-
lative of the Due Process Clause because it deprived the petitioner
of his license without reference to the very factor (fault) fundamental
to the State's statutory scheme. In effect, the Georgia statute raised
a conclusive presumption that an uninsured motorist was at fault.
Stanley v. Illinois2 ' held invalid an Illinois statute providing
that children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother,
13. Id. at 797-98. The Court suggested that continuity could better be achieved if the
teacher chose her own cut-off date and notified the school board at a sufficiently advance
date.
14. Mrs. La Fleur and Mrs. Nelson both were compelled to leave work with only a few
months left in the school term. Both were willing and able to finish the term.
The Court took note of the fact that the Cleveland rule would be hard put to further
the goal of continuity since it required only two week's notice before the commencement of
leave. Id. at 798 n. 11.
15. The records of the case suggest that the regulations were adopted to save teachers
from embarassment and to insulate school children from the sight of a pregnant woman.
Apparently one member of the Chesterfield County School Board feared that a child might
Interpret the teacher's condition as being the result of ingesting a watermelon. Id. at 797,
n. 9.
16. La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); see Shelton V.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Here, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, held invalid an
Arkansas statute requiring every teacher, as a condition of employment, to file annually an
affidavit listing every organization to which he had belonged within the preceding five
years on the grounds that the breadth of the statute went beyond what was necessary to
achieve any legitimate state purpose. See also Tally v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1959), where
the Court held invalid a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the distribution of any handbill
unless the handbill has printed on it the name and address of the person who prepared,
distributed, or sponsored it.
17. 94 S. Ct. at 798.
18. Id. at 799. Refer to n. 25 infra.
19. See, e.g., Vlandis v. m0ine, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) ; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
20. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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are declared wards of the state without any hearing of parental
fitness. Justice White's majority opinion concluded:
The State's interest is caring for Stanley's children in De min-
imus if Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists on pre-
suming rather than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because
it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the
Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify
refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the
dismemberment of his family.22
In Vlandis v. Kline23 the Court struck down a Connecticut dura-
tional residence requirement conditioning eligibility for instate uni-
ersity tuition rates on prior state citizenship. The majority assumed
that a state might charge nonresidents higher tuition than that
paid by residents. 24 The Court held that none of the reasons ad-
vanced by Connecticut could justify a permanent and irrebuttable
presumption that those who move to a state shortly before matricu-
lation are not residents.
2 5
The Court in La Fleur argued that the school board's rules
conclusively presume that every pregnant teacher is incapable of
teaching at a uniform fixed time.26 Medical experts, however, agreed
that the ability of any particular pregnant teacher to continue work-
ing past a fixed period is an individual matter.27 Therefore it is
evident that large numbers of teachers who are fully capable and
qualified to continue teaching are forced to quit work merely because
they are pregnant.2 The conclusive presumptions embodied in the
school board's rules are neither "necessarily nor universally true"
and are therefore violative of the Due Process Clause.2 9 The man-
datory maternity leave cut-off dates attempt a legitimate goal, but
because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize
a female teacher for deciding to bear children they do not meet
the requirments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3 0 For similar reasons, the Cleveland requirement that a teach-
er may not become eligible to teach after delivery of her child
until the beginning of the school term following the third month of
her child's life, is violative of the Due Process Clause.81
22. Id. at 657-58.
29. 93 S. Ot. 2230 (1973).
24. Id. at 2233.
25. Chief Justice Burger dissenting In Viandis concluded that the use of irrebuttable
presumptions is tantamount to engrafting "close judicial scrutiny" on to the Due Process
Clause. He notes that thousands of state statutes create classifications which raise con-
clusive presumptions, which are less than perfect, and which might be Improved by indi-
vidualized determinations. The Chief Justice urges that the Court should erect standards
that are not unrealistic. Id. at 2241-42 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
26. 94 S. Ct. at 798.
27. Id. at 799.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 800.
31. Id. at 800-01.
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It appears that the use of irrebuttable presumptions is a tool
which the Court uses to call attention to the components of a
challenged statute. In Carrington v. Rash2 the Court rules uncon-
stitutional a Texas statute which prohibited all military personnel
from voting in the State on the presumption that since servicemen
were not bona fide residents, all could be treated as non-residents.
Both the majority and the dissent acknowledged that the challenged
law's constitutionality depended upon the reasonableness of the clas-
sification which the state had devised. 8 By noting the irrebuttable
presumption, the Court sought to illustrate that the Texas legislature
had assumed that most servicemen who lived in Texas were not
domiciled there and that the legislature applied this assumption
to all military personnel who made their home in Texas. The Court
then applied the test of reasonableness to both the irrebuttable
presumption and the statute's application.
In La Fleur the irrebuttable presumption that a pregnant teacher
was incapable of teaching after a fixed time did not make the
challenged regulation unconstitutional. Rather, it was the combina-
tion of the presumption's incorrectness and the classification's over-
inclusiveness. Had the school boards set a firm date during the
last few weeks of pregnancy, the regulations might have fallen
within constitutional parameters.3 4 In such a situation both the pre-
sumption (incapacity) and the classification (all pregnant teachers)
might have been reasonable in light of the school board's legitimate
goals.
The application of an irrebuttable presumption analysis to various
state statutes may place these statutes in jeopardy. 5 Literally thou-
sands of statutes draw lines such as those drawn by the school
boards maternity leave rules .8 It is conceivable that the irrebut-
table presumptions approach could be used to sustain challenges
to such laws as mandatory retirement of government employees,
voting age requirements, driving age limitations and the like.
7
The significance of La Fleur probably lies in that the Court
chose not to apply Equal Protection standards to the challenged
32. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
33. Id. at 93, 99.
34. The Court appears to imply that it would be justifiable to raise an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that during the final weeks of pregnancy all pregnant teachers are too debilitated
to continue working. See 94 S .CL at 799-800 n. 13.
35. Id. at 805 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. 412 U.S. 441 (1973), (Burger, C. J., dissenting). See n. 25 supra.
37. 94 S. Ct. at 805-06. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, would move away filom "irrebuttable
presumptions" altogether because it would necessitate application to other statutes which
draw lines such as those in La Fleur on an individual, ad hoc, basis. The dissent notes that
all legislation involves lines being drawn, and the lines necessarily result in certain indi-
viduals who are disadvantaged by the lines being drawn. See Williamson v. Lee Optical
Company, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Justice Powell In his concurring opinion agrees with the dissent that the end of the
road that the Court had embarked on using irrebuttable presumptions is nowhere in sight.
94 S. Ct. at 802.
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regulations.8 Following Frontiero v. Richardson- it appeared that
the Court was on the verge of recognizing sex based classifications
as being inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
In La Fleur, the Court failed to meet the real issue of sex discrimi-
nation head on. Whether or not La Fleur indicates a withdrawal
from Equal Protection as applied to sex discrimination is a question
yet to be answered.
4 0
RICHARD A. CLAPP
STATES-FEDERAL LAW AS SUPERSEDING STATE LEGISLATION-NORTH
DAKOTA GARNISHMENT AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT STATUTES ARE
PRE-EMPTED INSOFAR AS THEY FRUSTRATE THE CONSUMER CREDIT PRO-
TECTION ACT.
The United States Secretary of Labor alleged that two practices
employed in Grand Forks County in aid of execution and garnish-
ment, pursuant to the North Dakota Century Code, violated provi-
sions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).11 The first
allowed a garnishee-employer to pay the entire wages of a debtor-
employee to the clerk of court or sheriff pending a judicial deter-
mination; the second permitted the sheriff to levy judgment on
the debtor's earnings which were in payroll check form but un-
distributed by the debtors' employer. The United States District
Court, District of North Dakota, held these practices circumvented
the purposes of the CCPA. The Act therefore pre-empted the of-
fending Code provisions 2 to the extent necessary to assure com-
pliance. The Clerk of Court for the First Judicial District of North
38. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion would have applied an Equal Protection
analysis to the challenged rules. He did not reach the question whether strict judicial scru-
tiny should be applied. 94 S. Ct. at 802-04 (Powell, J., concurring).
The federal appellate decisions dealing with mandatory maternity leave rules were
all based upon an Equal Protection analysis. See Green v. Waterford Board of Education,
473 F.2d 629 (2nd Cir. 1973); Buckly v. Coyle Public School System, 476 F.2d 92 (10th
Cir. 1973); Schattman v. Texas Emplodyment Commission, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
39. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero a plurality of the Court found sex based classifica-
tions to be inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
40. For additional discussion of maternity leave see Comment, Mandatory Maternity
Leave of Absence Policies-An Equal Protection Analysis, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 240 (1972) ; See
also, Comment, Love's Labor Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV. CiV.
RIGHTs--CIv. LIB. L. Rxv. 260 (1972).
1. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1970). This
discussion deals exclusively with Title III-Restriction on Garnishment, 82 Stat. 146, 162
(1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1671-77 (1970) hereinafter referred to as CCPA, or the Act.
2. N.D. CENT. ConE §§ 28-21-08, 32-09-17 (1960).
